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Does Central Bank Intervention 
Stabilize Foreign Exchange Rates?
By Catherine Bonser-Neal
S
ince the adoption of a flexible exchange rate
system in 1973, central banks of most indus-
trialized countries have continued to inter-
vene in foreign exchange markets. One reason is
that exchange rate volatility has increased. To
reduce  volatility, many European countries have
agreed to keep exchange rates within a band
around a target exchange rate, implementing this
policy by intervening in foreign exchange mar-
kets when necessary. Even without an explicit
exchange rate commitment, countries such as the
United States and Japan have intervened in
foreign exchange markets to help stabilize
exchange rates.
Opinions differ on whether central banks can
stabilize exchange rates. Some analysts believe
central bank intervention can reduce exchange
rate volatility by stopping speculative attacks
against a currency. Other analysts, though,
believe central bank intervention may increase
volatility if the intervention contributes to mar-
ket uncertainty or encourages speculative attacks
against the currency.
This article presents empirical evidence on this
controversy. The first section discusses why ex-
change rates are volatile and why policymakers
may want to reduce volatility. The second section
examines how central bank intervention may
affect volatility. The third section presents em-
pirical evidence suggesting that central bank
intervention does not generally reduce exchange
rate volatility. Rather, central bank intervention
typically appears to have had little effect on
volatility.
EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 
This section discusses the causes and conse-
quences of exchange rate volatility. Also dis-
cussed are various ways to measure exchange rate
volatility.
Causes of volatility
Exchange rate volatility is often attributed to
three factors: volatility in market fundamentals,
changes in expectations due to new information,
and speculative bandwagons (Engel and Hakkio).
Volatility in market fundamentals, such as the
money supply, income, and interest rates, affects
exchange rate volatility because the level of the
exchange rate is a function of these fundamentals.
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can lead to changes in the level of the exchange
rate. Changes in the level of the exchange rate in
turn imply exchange rate volatility. 
Changes in expectations about future market
fundamentals or economic policies also affect
exchange rate volatility. When market partici-
pants receive new information, they alter their
forecasts of future economic conditions and poli-
cies. Exchange rates based on these forecasts will
also change, thereby leading to exchange rate
volatility. For example, news about a change in
monetary policy may cause market participants
to revise their expectations of future money
supply growth and interest rates, which could
alter the level and hence the volatility of the
exchange rate.
In addition to being affected by expectations
of future fundamentals and policies, volatility is
also affected by the degree of confidence with
which these expectations are held. For instance,
if traders are uncertain about their forecasts of
future economic conditions, they are more likely
to revise their currency positions once new infor-
mation becomes available. These revisions to
currency positions in turn imply an increase in
the frequency, and hence in the volatility, of
exchange rate changes. In brief, exchange rate
volatility tends to rise with increases in market
uncertainty about future economic conditions
and tends to fall when new information helps
resolve market uncertainty.
Finally, exchange rate volatility can be caused
by speculative bandwagons, or speculative exchange
rate movements unrelated to current or expected
market fundamentals. For example, if enough
speculators buy dollars because they believe the
dollar will appreciate, the dollar could appreciate
regardless of fundamentals. If it then becomes
apparent that market fundamentals will not sus-
tain such an appreciation, active selling by the
same speculators could cause the dollar to depre-
ciate. Swings in the value of the dollar arising
from such speculative forces can contribute to
exchange rate volatility.
Consequences of volatility
Regardless of its origin, there are several reasons
why authorities may want to reduce exchange
rate volatility (Becketti and Sellon). One reason
is that volatility may impede international invest-
ment flows. By adding risk to the rate of return
on a foreign asset, exchange rate volatility may
reduce investment in foreign financial assets. In
addition, companies may be reluctant to build a
new plant or purchase a foreign company if
exchange rate uncertainty reduces the expected
profits from such projects. As a result, exchange
rate volatility could disrupt the efficient alloca-
tion of resources in the world economy by creat-
ing a disincentive for investment capital to move
abroad.
Another reason why authorities may want to
reduce volatility is that it may adversely affect
international trade. Volatile exchange rates create
uncertainty about the revenues to be earned on
international transactions. Such volatility could
force companies to add a risk premium to the
costs of goods they sell abroad. If these costs are
passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices, the demand for traded goods could decrease.
In addition, firms themselves may be more reluc-
tant to engage in international trade if exchange
rate volatility adds an extra risk to their profits. 
A final reason to reduce exchange rate volatility
is that it could spill over into U.S. financial
markets. If exchange rate volatility increases the
riskiness of U.S. assets, the prices of these assets
could also become more volatile. The increased
volatility of financial markets could threaten the
stability of the financial system and make mone-
tary policy goals more difficult to attain.
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be reduced? Exchange rate volatility depends in
part on market expectations and market specula-
tion. Some analysts believe central bank interven-
tion in foreign exchange markets can reduce
exchange rate volatility in two waysby reducing
the expected volatility of future market fundamen-
tals and policies and by reducing the likelihood
of speculative exchange rate movements. But
before investigating whether central bank inter-
vention can reduce volatility, it is first necessary
to appropriately measure volatility.
Measuring volatility
While there are many ways to measure volatility,
a useful measure to study the effects of central
bank intervention should reflect the effects of
intervention on both current and expected future
exchange rate volatility. This property is important
because intervention can have opposite effects on
current and expected future volatility. For exam-
ple, if intervention causes a large change in
todays exchange rate but reduces foreign exchange
market uncertainty, investors will observe an
increase in current exchange rate volatility but a
decrease in expected future volatility. A volatil-
ity measure that is forward-looking will capture
both the immediate and longer term effects of
intervention.
Commonly used measures of volatility, such as
standard deviation and generalized autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity, or GARCH,
estimates, are not forward-looking. The standard
deviation measure is computed using only past
values of the exchange rates. GARCH estimates
of volatility are also calculated using a time series
of past exchange rate changes. As a result, neither
measure captures what volatility is expected to be
in the future.
This study uses a measure known as implied
volatility, which is derived from the price of a
foreign currency option.
1 Implied volatility is
forward-looking  because it measures the markets
forecast of future exchange rate volatility. As a
result, it can capture both the immediate and
longer term effects of central bank intervention.
A foreign currency option is a contract that
gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation,
to buy or sell foreign currency at a fixed price at
some date in the future.
2 In the United States,
currency option contracts conferring the right to
buy or sell standardized amounts of foreign
currency are traded on the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange. The price of the currency option con-
tract is determined in a competitive market and
is quoted in terms of dollars per unit of foreign
currency.
The price of a currency option is influenced by
several factors. These factors include the under-
lying spot exchange rate, the fixed price (the
strike or exercise price) at which the buyer of
the option can buy or sell the foreign currency
in the future, U.S. and foreign interest rates, and
the expected standard deviation of the change in
the spot exchange rate over the life of the option.
The expected standard deviation, or volatility, of
future exchange rate changes affects the price of
the option because in many ways the option
contract is like an insurance contract.  In essence,
the buyer of an option contract holds an insur-
ance contract that places a bound on losses due
to adverse exchange rate movements, but no
bound on the gains due to favorable exchange
rate movements. Because the losses are limited
while the gains are unlimited, greater volatility of
the exchange rate increases the value of the
option and hence its price. The currency options
price therefore increases if exchange rate volatil-
ity is expected to increase, and the price falls if
exchange rate volatility is expected to decrease.
Because option prices are partly a function of the
expected standard deviation of future exchange
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expected  volatility given knowledge of the option
price and an option pricing model. The volatility
estimate extracted in this manner is called
implied volatility.
This measure of volatility is useful for several
reasons. First, implied volatility is forward-
looking because it reflects the markets expecta-
tion of the future standard deviation of the spot
exchange rate. Second, implied volatility is a
market-based measure of volatility. Currency
option prices are determined in a competitive
market using all available information. Hence,
volatility estimated from the option price will
also reflect these competitive forces and the mar-
kets information. Finally, because implied vola-
tilities are available daily, measures of daily
central bank intervention can be related to daily
changes in exchange rate volatility to determine
the direct impact of intervention.
Options data between 1985 and 1991 obtained
from the Philadelphia Stock Exchanges transac-
tions data base are used to estimate implied
volatilities. The 1985-91 period was chosen for
the following reasons. First, currency options
have been traded on the Philadelphia Exchange
only since 1982. As a result, implied volatilities
cannot be estimated prior to 1982. Second, as
discussed below, the bulk of intervention in the
post-1980 period took place between 1985 and
1991. Intervention was rare between 1992 and
1994. While a significant amount of intervention
occurred in 1995, the amounts for the year as a
whole will not be disclosed until sometime in
1996. Estimates of volatility over the 1985-91
period, therefore, provide the most useful infor-
mation on the effects of intervention on exchange
rate volatility.
3 
Figure 1 shows the implied deutschemark and
yen volatilities from 1985 to 1991. These implied
volatilities are daily estimates of the markets
forecast of the standard deviation of exchange
rate changes over the average life of options in
the sample. In this case, the average life equals
slightly more than one month.
4 The figure shows
that deutschemark and yen volatilities varied
between 5 and 25 percent on an annual basis over
this period, and that average volatility was 12.4
percent for the deutschemark and 11.1 percent
for the yen. The relation between central bank





In a flexible exchange rate system there are no
well-defined rules governing when central banks
should intervene in foreign exchange markets.
Instead, U.S. policy toward foreign exchange
market intervention is guided by the concepts
described in the International Monetary Funds
Principles for the Guidance of Members Exchange
Rate Policiesin particular, that a member should
intervene in the exchange market if necessary to
counter disorderly conditions which may be
characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term
movements in the exchange value of its currency
(p. 11). How policymakers interpret the term
disorderly conditions and consequently the
amount and direction of intervention can vary
over time.
5 Given the ambiguity surrounding the
motivation for intervention, many have also
questioned whether central bank intervention is
effective in reducing volatility. This section de-
scribes U.S. intervention policy to counter dis-
orderly conditions during the 1985-91 period of
active intervention and discusses the potential
effect of intervention on exchange rate volatility.
U.S. intervention policy 
When the Federal Reserve intervenes in foreign
exchange markets, it buys or sells foreign assets
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1996 47in return for U.S. dollars. For example, if the
Federal Reserve intervenes to reduce the dollars
value against the deutschemark, it buys deutsche-
mark assets with dollars. This operation leads to
an increase in dollar reserves and could lead to
an increase in the U.S. money supply if no further
action were taken. Federal Reserve operating pro-
cedures, however, routinely sterilize the effect of
intervention on bank reserves. In the example,
the Federal Reserve would sterilize the purchase
of deutschemark assets by selling an equal
amount of U.S. Treasury securities. Sterilized
intervention therefore alters only the composi-
tion of U.S. and foreign securities in the hands
of the public, leaving bank reserves and the
money supply unchanged.
While intervention by U.S. monetary authori-
ties to counter disorderly markets has been
evident over the last ten years, the bulk of this
intervention occurred from 1985 to 1991. The
1985-91 period can be divided roughly into three
intervention regimes, reflecting different U.S.
policies toward foreign exchange market inter-
vention. These regimes fall into three time periods.
Plaza period   Jan.  1,  1985, to Feb. 21, 1987
Louvre period   Feb. 22, 1987, to Dec. 31, 1989
Post-Louvre period   Jan. 1, 1990, to Dec. 31, 1991
During the first regime, the Plaza period, the goal
of intervention was an orderly depreciation of
the dollar. This goal was formalized in the Plaza
Agreement of September 22, 1985, by the finance
ministers of the G-5 countries. In their policy
statement, the ministers and governors of the G-5
countries stated that exchange rates should better
reflect fundamental economic conditions than has
been the case. . . . In view of the present and
prospective changes in fundamentals, some further
orderly appreciation of the main nondollar cur-
rencies against the dollar is desirable. They stand
ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this
when to do so would be helpful. In brief, the G-5
ministers agreed to sell dollars to bring about an
orderly decline in the value of the dollar.
The second intervention regime, the Louvre
period, lasted from February 22, 1987, to Decem-
ber 31, 1989. In contrast to the earlier regime,
which sought to change the level of the exchange
rate, intervention during this period was used to
stabilize exchange rates around existing levels. In
their February 22, 1987 statement, the ministers
and governors of the G-6 countries said that
currencies were within ranges broadly consistent
with  underlying  economic fundamentals, and
they agreed to cooperate closely to foster stabil-
ity of exchange rates around current levels. For
this article, the end of the Louvre period is taken
to be December 31, 1989.
6 
The third intervention regime, the post-Louvre
period, lasted from January 1, 1990, to December
31, 1991. During this time, Federal Reserve inter-
vention became less frequent and less likely to be
coordinated with other central banks.
7 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of actual daily dollar
purchases and sales by the Federal Reserve against
the deutschemark and Japanese yen across these
three regimes. The figure shows substantial vari-
ation in the frequency and magnitudes of inter-
vention through time. In the first period, U.S.
intervention was large in late 1985, coinciding
with the September 1985 Plaza Agreements call
for an orderly depreciation of the dollar. During
the 1987-89 period, intervention activity reflected
the attempts of the Federal Reserve to stabilize
DM/dollar and yen/ dollar exchange rates under
the Louvre Accord. Finally, the frequency and
average magnitude of Federal Reserve interven-
tion decreased from 1990 to 1991.
Despite the differences in the implementation
of intervention policy across the three regimes,
exchange rate volatility remained a concern that
guided policy. This concern dominated policy
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYFEDERAL RESERVE INTERVENTION
Chart 2
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Intervention Against Yen














1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1985
Intervention Against Deutschemark














1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1985
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1996 49decisions during the Louvre period, but it was
also relevant during the Plaza period when
authorities called for an orderly depreciation of
the dollar. Volatility was even of concern during
the post-Louvre period when intervention was
less frequent, as evidenced by the perceptions of
some that the United States had reestablished
target zone ranges for the dollar (Bergsten).
Whether central bank intervention was successful
in reducing exchange rate volatility during the
1985-91 period is examined below.
The effects of central bank intervention
Just how central bank intervention affects ex-
change rate volatility depends on how it affects
the causes of volatilitynamely, the volatility of
actual market fundamentals, changes in the
expectations of future fundamentals or policies,
and speculative bandwagons. Intervention typi-
cally has no direct impact on the first source of
volatility, the volatility of actual market funda-
mentals, because intervention is sterilized. Theo-
retically, sterilized intervention should not affect
the money supply, interest rates, or income.
8
Whether central bank intervention increases or
decreases exchange rate volatility, therefore,
depends on how intervention affects market
expectations and speculative behavior. Because
these effects are ambiguous, it is not clear how
central bank intervention affects exchange rate
volatility. That is, intervention could leave vola-
tility lower, higher, or unchanged.
Intervention may decrease volatility. Central bank
intervention may reduce exchange rate volatility
if it resolves uncertainty by market participants
about future monetary policy. For example, if the
market is uncertain about the stance of monetary
policy, then intervention to halt a drop in the
dollar may signal that the Federal Reserve is
committed to a tight monetary policy. The reso-
lution of uncertainty about future monetary pol-
icy may then lead to less exchange rate volatility.
9
Central bank intervention may also reduce
exchange rate volatility by reducing the likeli-
hood of a speculative bandwagon. The following
example shows how intervention might reduce
volatility if market participants think the central
bank will intervene when speculative forces
become dominant. Suppose the dollar exchange
rate falls from DM 1.50/$ to DM 1.45/$. As
speculators see the dollar falling, they may jump
on the bandwagon thinking the dollar may fall
further to DM 1.40/$. Under this scenario, specu-
lators who sell $1 million at DM 1.45/$ could
make a profit if the dollar falls to DM 1.40/$ and
they reacquired dollars at the lower value.
10 How-
ever, if the central bank intervenes at DM 1.45/$
and pushes the dollar back to DM 1.50/$, then
speculators could suffer a loss.
11 Speculators may
therefore become reluctant to push the dollar
down too rapidly if they believe the central bank
will intervene to prevent the dollar from falling.
By reducing selling pressure when the dollar
starts to fall, central bank intervention could
reduce speculative bandwagons and thereby
reduce volatility.
Intervention may increase volatility. Central bank
intervention could actually increase exchange
rate volatility if intervention increases private
sector uncertainty about central bank policies. In
particular, market uncertainty about the exist-
ence, magnitude, and meaning of central bank
intervention implies exchange rates could become
less predictable and therefore more volatile. Sup-
pose, for example, the central bank surprises
traders by intervening to increase the value of
the dollar but announces neither the interven-
tions magnitude nor its motivation. In making
their trades, foreign exchange traders must now
guess the meaning of the intervention and
attempt to infer the implications of the action
for future policy. Because their trades are based
on incomplete information, traders will need
to revise their currency positions once more
information about intervention policy becomes
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYavailable. These changes in currency positions
imply changes in the exchange rate and hence
greater exchange rate volatility. Given that central
banks rarely reveal their currency positions at the
time they occur, uncertainty about central bank
intervention is potentially an important source
of exchange rate volatility.
Market uncertainty about the likelihood of
future central bank intervention could also lead
to greater exchange rate volatility. Because
central banks do not announce their plans for
intervention, foreign exchange traders must
base their currency positions on their best
guesses of whether and when central banks will
intervene. These currency positions and hence
exchange rates will change over time as traders
reassess the likelihood of central bank interven-
tion. Uncertainty over central bank intervention
policy can therefore contribute to exchange rate
volatility. 
Central bank intervention can also increase
exchange rate volatility by increasing the likeli-
hood of speculative bandwagons. For instance,
intervention might increase volatility if market
participants think the central bank is unable or
unwilling to prevent speculative forces from
pushing the exchange rate in a particular direc-
tion. A slight change to the previous example
makes the point. Again, suppose the dollar
exchange rate falls from DM 1.50/$ to DM 1.45/$
and that speculators expect the dollar to fall
further to DM 1.40/$. As before, a speculator
selling the dollar at DM 1.45/$ might expect to
realize a profit if the dollar falls to DM 1.40/$.
The expected profit opportunity encourages
other speculators to jump on the bandwagon,
thereby actually pushing down the dollar. Unlike
the previous example in which speculators
thought the Federal Reserve would intervene to
prevent the dollar from falling, they may now be
uncertain  about Federal Reserve intervention
policy. For example, they may think the Federal
Reserve will not intervene or they may think the
amount of intervention will not be large enough
to make a difference. For whatever reason, the
uncertainty about intervention policy may en-
courage speculation and cause price changes and
exchange rate volatility to be higher than in the
absence of such intervention. 
Intervention may have no effect on volatility.
Finally, central bank intervention may have no
impact on exchange rate volatility. The sheer size
of the foreign exchange market makes this
scenario a possibility. For example, in 1989 the
average net daily volume of trading in the foreign
exchange market was over $400 billion, while
the average amount bought or sold by the
Federal Reserve was about $150 million.
12 Thus,
central bank intervention, which is such a small
fraction of the overall market, typically less
than 0.05 percent, is unlikely to have a large
impact.
It is clear from the above discussion that theory
is ambiguous on the effects of central bank
intervention on exchange rate volatility. In addi-
tion, the effects of intervention can change over
time as a result of variations in the credibility
of intervention policy. Empirical evidence is
needed, therefore, to assess the impacts of inter-
vention on volatility and thereby shed light on
the ability of central bank intervention to stabi-
lize exchange rates.
EVIDENCE ON CENTRAL BANK
INTERVENTION AND VOLATILITY
As discussed above, central bank intervention
may increase, decrease, or have no effect on
volatility. Empirical analysis is required to
answer whether central bank intervention reduces
exchange rate volatility. This section estimates a
model that relates changes in deutschemark/dollar
and yen/dollar volatility to central bank inter-
vention and other economic variables.
13
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To test whether central bank intervention
reduces exchange rate volatility, an empirical
model relating changes in volatility to interven-
tion is required. Previous studies of the effect of
central bank intervention estimate exchange rate
volatility using GARCH methods. These GARCH
estimates of volatility are then related to measures
of U.S. and foreign central bank intervention.
The results of such studies are mixed, with some
studies finding intervention increases exchange
rate volatility and others finding the opposite.
14 
The empirical model used in this study also
relates exchange rate volatility to measures of
central bank intervention, but it differs from the
earlier models in two important respects. First,
exchange rate volatility is measured by the
implied volatility embedded in foreign currency
option prices. The advantage of the implied
volatility measure is that it is forward-looking
and measures the markets forecast of the standard
deviation of exchange rate changes over the next
month. Second, the empirical model used in this
study includes U.S. macroeconomic and other
variables to ensure that volatility changes attrib-
uted to intervention do not in fact arise from
some other macroeconomic cause of volatility.
The U.S. macroeconomic variables include the
change in the volatility of the S&P 500, the
announced values of the money supply, trade
deficit, consumer price index, producer price
index, industrial production, and unemployment
rate, as well as the unexpected components of
these announcements. The other variables included
in the regression are lagged exchange rate volatil-
ity to control for feedback effects from volatility
to intervention, and a variable to capture any
differences in volatilities as a result of the break
in trading over weekends and holidays. Equations
(1) and (2) summarize the empirical model used
to test the effects of intervention on DM/dollar
and yen/dollar exchange rate volatilities:
15
% D (DM/dollar volatility) = b0 + b1 Fed intervention
+ b2 Bundesbank intervention
+ b3 Macro & other  variables + error  term . (1)
% D (yen/dollar volatility) = b0 + b1 Fed intervention
+ b2 Bank of Japan  intervention
+ b3 Macro  & other variables + error term. (2)
Equation (1) is estimated using actual interven-
tion against the deutschemark by the Federal
Reserve and German Bundesbank. Actual interven-
tion data provide a daily record of the occurrence
and amounts of intervention and were obtained
from these central banks. 
Equation (2) is estimated using actual Federal
Reserve intervention against the Japanese yen.
Because the Bank of Japan does not publicly
report its daily intervention activities, actual
Bank of Japan intervention cannot be used in the
estimation of equation (2). This paper instead
uses Wall Street Journal press reports to obtain a
measure of Bank of Japan intervention. The Wall
Street Journal contains a daily foreign exchange
column which reports trader perceptions of the
existence, but not the magnitude, of central bank
intervention. As a result, the Bank of Japan
intervention variable equals one if the Wall Street
Journal reports intervention by the Bank of
Japan, and zero otherwise.
16
Empirical results 
The empirical results from estimating equa-
tions (1) and (2) are summarized in Tables 1 and
2. Before looking at the results in detail, four
results are summarized below:
(1) During the entire 1985-91 period, there is no
evidence that central bank intervention reduced
52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYexchange rate volatility and some evidence that
volatility actually increased (Table 1).
(2) During the Plaza period, there is no evi-
dence that central bank intervention affected
exchange rate volatility (panel A of Table 2).
(3) During the Louvre period, there is evidence
that central bank intervention increased volatil-
ity (panel B of Table 2).
(4) During the post-Louvre period, there is
some evidence that central bank intervention
decreased volatility, although most of the evi-
dence points to no effect (panel C of Table 2).
Turning to the specific results, the rows of
Tables 1 and 2 report the intervention variable
coefficients from the estimation of equations (1)
and (2). What matters in determining the effects
of intervention on volatility are the sign and
statistical significance of the coefficient. An
intervention coefficient that is negative and
significant suggests central bank intervention
reduced exchange rate volatility and therefore
was stabilizing. An intervention coefficient that
is positive and significant suggests that interven-
tion increased exchange rate volatility. Finally,
an intervention coefficient that is insignificantly
different from zero suggests that central bank
intervention had no effect on exchange rate
volatility. To simplify reading the table, a coef-
ficient appears in a shaded box if the effect of
intervention was statistically significant. Therefore,
if no boxes are shaded, then intervention had
no significant effect on volatility. In contrast, if
many boxes are shaded, then intervention had
a significant effect on volatility. In these cases,
the sign of the coefficient indicates whether
intervention increased or decreased volatility.
During the 1985-91 period, there is no evidence
that central bank intervention decreased exchange
rate volatility and some evidence that volatility
increased. This evidence can be seen in Table 1,
where two boxes are shaded and have positive
coefficients. In particular, the first row of the
table shows that Federal Reserve intervention had
Table 1




















* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level
** Indicates significance at the 5 percent level
Notes: The coefficients are multiplied by 100, and the t-statistics are in parentheses. The shaded areas indicate areas in
which the coefficients on the intervention variables are significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2
CENTRAL BANK INTERVENTION AND VOLATILITY: 
PLAZA, LOUVRE, POST-LOUVRE PERIODS
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volatility, and the second row shows that re-
ported Bank of Japan intervention had a positive
and significant effect on yen/dollar volatility.
Bundesbank intervention, however, did not sig-
nificantly affect exchange rate volatility.
Since the credibility and effectiveness of inter-
vention may change over time, Table 2 reports
the effect of intervention on volatility during the
Plaza, Louvre, and post-Louvre periods. The table
shows that the effects of intervention on exchange
rate volatility did indeed vary across time. Panel
A shows that during the Plaza period, interven-
tion had no significant effect on exchange rate
volatility because none of the boxes are shaded.
In contrast, panel B presents evidence that inter-
vention  increased volatility during the Louvre
period. This can be seen because two boxes have
positive coefficients and are shaded. Federal
Reserve intervention led to greater DM/dollar
volatility, while reported Bank of Japan interven-
tion led to greater yen/dollar volatility. This
increase in volatility occurred despite G-7 attempts
to foster stability of exchange rates around
current levels.  Finally, panel C presents some
evidence that central bank intervention decreased
exchange rate volatility, although most of the
evidence points to no effect. This can be seen
because only one box is shaded and it has a negative
coefficient. That is, over this period, Federal
Reserve intervention against the deutschemark led
to a decline in DM/dollar volatility. Federal
Reserve intervention against the yen, Bundes-
bank intervention, and reported Bank of Japan
intervention had no significant effect on volatility.
To summarize, the evidence presented provides
little support for the view that central bank
intervention decreases exchange rate volatility.
Indeed, from early 1985 until late 1991, central
bank intervention generally had little effect on
volatility and in some cases even increased
exchange rate volatility. The empirical results
also show that the effects of central bank inter-
vention varied through time. For example, cen-
tral bank intervention was associated with
increases in DM/dollar and yen/dollar volatility
during the Louvre period, but with a decrease in
DM/dollar volatility during the post-Louvre
period. Such differences in the volatility responses
to intervention may have been due to differences
in the credibility or effectiveness of intervention
across different policy regimes.
CONCLUSION
Concerns over the adverse effects of exchange
rate volatility have led central banks to intervene
in foreign exchange markets in an attempt to
reduce volatility. Whether central bank interven-
tion can be used to stabilize exchange rates
depends how intervention actually affects exchange
rate volatility. Theory contains no clear predic-
tions. Central bank intervention could reduce
exchange rate volatility if it helps resolve market
uncertainty about future fundamentals and poli-
cies or if it reduces the likelihood of speculative
attacks on a currency. Conversely, if central bank
intervention contributes to market uncertainty
or if it encourages speculative attacks against a
currency, then intervention could actually increase
exchange rate volatility. Because theory is am-
biguous, empirical analysis is needed to deter-
mine the effect of central bank intervention on
exchange rate volatility. 
This article has used estimates of daily
DM/dollar and yen/dollar volatilities, as well as
data on Federal Reserve, Bundesbank, and Bank
of Japan intervention, from 1985 to 1991 to
measure the effects of intervention on volatility.
The evidence suggests that central bank interven-
tion does not generally reduce exchange rate
volatility. Rather, central bank intervention typi-
cally has little effect on exchange rate volatility
and in some cases even increases volatility.  
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1 Others who have used implied volatility to measure
exchange rate volatility include Bailey, Bonser-Neal and
Tanner, and Madura and Tucker.  Bailey studies the effect
of money supply announcements on implied exchange rate
volatility, while Madura and Tucker study the effect of trade
deficit announcements on implied exchange rate volatility.
Bonser-Neal and Tanner are the first to examine the effects
of central bank intervention on implied exchange rate volatility.
2 See, for example, Hopper for a description of foreign
currency options. Grabbe also provides a thorough
discussion of currency options and of the factors which
affect their value.
3 Many types of currency option contracts are offered on
the Philadelphia exchange, but the volatility estimate used
here is based on at-the-money call options with from 7 to
100 days to maturity which are traded between 10:00 and
11:00 a.m.   At-the-money call options convey the right, but
not the obligation, to buy foreign exchange at a price that
equals the exchange rate on the day the option is purchased.
At-the-money call options with these maturities produce
more reliable estimates of volatility because the difference
between the estimated and the true option price is smaller
for this class of options, and because they are the most
actively traded (Bodurtha and Courtadon).  The choice of
options traded between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. is based on the
fact that trading volume for foreign currency options tends
to be highest around this time of day. Choosing the time of
day with the highest trading volume minimizes the number
of days for which there are no observations.
4 The algorithm proposed by Barone-Adesi and Whaley is
used to calculate the implied volatilities of the foreign
currency call options. The average maturity of options used
in the volatility estimation was roughly 38 days; hence, the
implied volatility represents the markets average forecast of
exchange rate volatility over the next 38 days.
5 In the United States, the monetary authority responsible
for setting U.S. foreign exchange intervention policy is the
U.S. Department of Treasury. The Federal Reserve acts as
the agent for the U.S. Treasury. See Humpage for a more
complete description of foreign exchange intervention
policy.
6 There are various views on when the Louvre period actually
ended. Baillie and Humpage suggest the Louvre Accord
broke down in late 1988. Wendy Dobson, who was Canadas
G-7 deputy from 1987 to 1989, suggests the coordination
underlying the Louvre Accord was breaking down in late
1989. Finally, Kaminsky and Lewis suggest the Louvre
Accord had ended by February 1990. The Louvre period
ending date used in this study is therefore in line with those
estimated by others.
7 As discussed earlier, intervention was even less frequent
between 1992 and 1994. While there was more intervention
in 1995, official intervention data for 1995 as a whole were
not available at the time of this study.
8 Sterilized intervention can in theory affect the exchange
rate through what is known as the portfolio balance channel.
Under this scenario, central bank intervention alters the
relative quantities of domestic and foreign bonds in the
hands of the public. If domestic and foreign assets are
imperfect substitutes, then market participants will try to
rebalance their portfolios following the intervention,
thereby leading to changes in exchange rates and interest
rates. While theoretically plausible, this portfolio balance
channel has received little empirical support (Edison).
9 This is an example of the expectations, or signaling,
channel through which sterilized intervention could affect
the level of the exchange rate. For more discussion, see
Edison.
10 The gain is calculated as follows. At an exchange rate of
DM 1.45/$, the speculator sold $1 million for DM 1.45
million. At an exchange rate of DM 1.40/$, the speculator
can then sell the DM 1.45 million for $1,035,714, for a profit
of $35,714.
11 The loss is calculated as follows. At an exchange rate of
DM 1.45/$, the speculator sold $1 million for DM 1.45
million. When the exchange rate rises back to DM 1.50/$,
the speculator who sells DM 1.45 million for $966,667
would incur a loss of $33,333.
12 See Bank of International Settlements for data on foreign
exchange market activity.  The average daily volume of
trading in the foreign exchange market is now estimated to
exceed $1 trillion. 
13 The model presented below is a simplified version of the
empirical model found in Bonser-Neal and Tanner.  That
paper extends the model described in this article by
examining the effects of intervention by all three central
banksthat is, the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank, and the
Bank of Japanon the volatility of DM/dollar and
yen/dollar  exchange rates, and by comparing the effects of
actual versus reported central bank intervention. That paper
also provides a more technical description of the variables
and the calculation of implied volatilities.
56 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY14 In particular, Baillie and Humpage find that intervention
between February 1987 and February 1990 was associated
with an increase in DM/dollar and yen/dollar exchange rate
volatility, while Connolly and Taylor find that Bank of
Japan intervention was associated with an increase in
yen/dollar volatility between 1977 and 1979.  Dominguez,
on the other hand, finds actual U.S. intervention was
associated with a decrease in DM/dollar and yen/dollar
volatility between 1985 and 1991.
15 Because options prices are quoted in terms of dollars per
unit of foreign currency, the implied volatility used in the
paper is actually the implied volatility of dollar/DM and
dollar/yen exchange rates.
16 In each regression, Federal Reserve intervention is
recorded at time t-1, while Bundesbank and Bank of Japan
intervention are recorded at time t. The reason is Federal
Reserve intervention on day t may not be completed and
hence not known by the time the volatility forecast is made
at 11:00 a.m. in the options market. Federal Reserve
intervention on day t-1, however, is known by 11:00 a.m. on
day  t. In contrast, Bundesbank and Bank of Japan
intervention is known by 11:00 EST on day t. This is because
the German market is six hours ahead of Philadelphia, while
Japan is 14 hours ahead.  Bundesbank and Bank of Japan
intervention,  which occurs on day t, can therefore be
included in the regressions.
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